Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Lan Sun
Author-Workplace-Name: UNE Business School, Faculty of the Professions, University of New England, Australia NSW2351
Author-Email: lansun@une.edu.au
Title: Executive Compensation And Contract-Driven Earnings Management 
Abstract: Earnings management is found to be driven by different managerial incentives. Previous studies have identified that executive compensation contracts create incentives for earnings management. The agency theory and the positive accounting theory provide explanations for contract-driven earnings management. This study links the agency theory and the positive accounting theory and reviews the early executive compensation studies, bonus plan maximisation hypothesis and equity-based compensation. The aim of this study is to shed light in explaining contractual incentives and provide useful information in understanding the executive compensation contract-driven earnings management behaviour.
Classification-JEL:
Keywords: Executive compensation, earnings management, contractual incentives, agency theory, positive accounting theory
Pages: 111–127
Volume: 8
Issue: 2
Year: 2012
File-URL:http://web.usm.my/journal/aamjaf/vol 8-2-2012/AAMJAF8-2-2012(111-127).pdf 
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:usm:journl:aamjaf00802_111-127