

***Guanxi*, Networks and Eloquence: Wu Tiecheng in the 1911 Revolution in Jiujiang, China**

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Abstract. This paper aims to examine how Wu Tiecheng (1888–1953), one of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Republican China senior statesmen, had established and developed his three crucial assets: *guanxi* (关系 relationships or connections), networks and eloquence since his formative years (1888–1910) until the 1911 Revolution in Jiujiang, China. His uniqueness as a revolutionary who was equipped with those three elements nurtured during the formative years of his youth was subsequently reflected during the revolution. Concurrently, this will explore prior and during the revolution, what types of *guanxi* and networks he had tried to establish, subsequently develop and even utilise. Furthermore, this paper also attempts to look into how those *guanxi*, networks and even eloquence had assisted Wu in his endeavours to become one of the leading revolutionaries in this revolution. In probing into the above mentioned aspects, it would trace the activities he had involved and roles played. Three essential elements apart from moulding and influencing Wu, had become part of his social capital which benefitted him and continuously to be utilised in the coming years. Those had given impetus to his rise within the KMT and Republican political circles, and also made him a distinct figure among peers.

Keywords and phrases: Wu Tiecheng, 1911 Revolution, *guanxi*, networks, eloquence

Introduction



Figure 1. Wu Tiecheng as Secretary-General of the KMT CEC broadcasting overseas on 30 May 1941 (source [with permission] from the Overseas Chinese Association webpage "*Chuanghui Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan* 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 Photos Exhibition of the Founding President Wu Tiecheng")



Figure 2. The first person on the right was Wu Tiecheng and next to Wu was Chiang Kai-shek. They inspected flag parade on 14 June 1943 (source [with permission] from the Overseas Chinese Association webpage "*Chuanghui Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan* 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 Photos Exhibition of the Founding President Wu Tiecheng")



Figure 3. Wu Tiecheng (behind the microphone) at Shanghai Children's Day on 4 April 1936 (Source [with permission] from the Overseas Chinese Association webpage "*Chuanghui Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan* 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 Photos Exhibition of the Founding President Wu Tiecheng")

Wu Tiecheng (or Wu Te-chen 吴铁城) (1888–1953), Cantonese, a native of Pinghu Village (*Pinghuxiang* 平湖乡), Xiangshan County (*Xiangshanxian* 香山县) which is present Zhongshan County (*Zhongshanxian* 中山县), Guangdong (广东), was born at Jiujiang (九江), Jiangxi (江西). He was introduced by Lin Sen (林森) to join the Revolutionary Alliance (*Tongmenghui* 同盟会) in 1909. After the 1911 Wuchang (武昌) Uprising until the early 1930s, Wu took up various important party and state positions at Jiujiang Military Government, Sun Yat-sen's (孙逸仙) Military Government, Sun Yat-sen's Presidential Office, Generalissimo's Headquarters, Xiangshan County, Canton City, Guangdong Province, Nationalist Government, Kuomintang (KMT) and other offices. He had been to Japan and Honolulu before returning to China in 1916. In the late 1920s, Wu began to demonstrate his abilities as a negotiator especially in getting Zhang Xueliang's (张学良) support during the Central Plains War that broke out in 1930.

From the 1930's to 1949, Wu Tiecheng's political career and position gradually reached a peak. During different periods of time, he took up pivotal positions

successively at city, province and central levels. On 6 January 1932, he was appointed Mayor of Shanghai and Garrison Command of Songhu (1932–1937), and subsequently on 24 March 1937 he was promoted to become Chairman of Guangdong Provincial Government, Head of civil administration department and public security Commander (1937–1938). After Guangdong was captured by the Japanese army, Wu in the spring of 1939 took charge of KMT party affairs in Hong Kong and Macau. On 20 November 1939, he went to Chongqing (重庆) to become the Director of KMT's Department of Overseas Affairs (1939–1941). Later in 1941, he served as Secretary-General of the KMT Central Executive Committee (CEC) (1941–1948). In the same year, Wu was also elected as President for both Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association (*Nanyang Huaqiao Xiehui* 南洋华侨协会) and Chinese People's Foreign Relations Association (*Zhongguo Guomin Waijiao Xiehui* 中国国民外交协会).

After China's victory in the War of Resistance, Wu reorganised the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association into Overseas Chinese Association (*Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui* 华侨协会总会) (OCA) to serve the Overseas Chinese throughout the world. He was elected in 1946 as delegate to the National Assembly and participated in the Political Consultative Conference (PCC). He took up the post of Vice President of the Legislative Yuan (1947–1948) on 20 June in the following year. Then he served as Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1948–1949) in Sun Fo's (孙科) cabinet until his resignation on March 1949. He was then entrusted during this critical and difficult moment with the mission to visit Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Philippines. In the same year, he became member of the Central Extraordinary Council in Canton (广州) in July and later went to Taiwan through Hong Kong to serve as presidential adviser and appraisal member of the KMT's CEC. He also restored the operation of non-governmental organisations such as the OCA and People's Foreign Relations Association. Wu died in Taipei in 1953 at the age of 66.¹

The Formative Years in Jiujiang, 1888–1910: *Guanxi*, Networks and Eloquence



Figure 4. The first one on the right was Lin Sen and next to him was Wu Tiecheng. They were wearing their revolution clothing in 1910 (source [with permission] from the Overseas Chinese Association webpage "*Chuanghui Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan* 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 Photos Exhibition of the Founding President Wu Tiecheng")

Wu Tiecheng was born at Jiujiang, Jiangxi on 9 March 1888, spending his childhood and youth there until he left around end of 1912 (Zheng 2011, 3974). However, Wu's father, Wu Yutian (吴玉田) and his mother, Madam Yu (余), both originally came from Xiangshan County, Guangdong before Wu Tiecheng was born (Wu 1993, 2). This would mean that Wu was actually a Cantonese who originated from Xiangshan. As such, his place of birth was Jiujiang while his native place was Xiangshan. When recounting Wu's early years, this paper will look into how associational identification to both places had benefited Wu in establishing relationships or connections or *guanxi* (关系) with other people. Subsequently, how *guanxi* nurtured emotional component or "affective component" or *ganqing* (感情) which was to be utilised that were useful in his later developments.

In fact, S. A. Smith concluded that native place was a key basis upon which the basic building block of social relations in China, *guanxi*, could be built. *Guanxi* are ties of mutual commitment and dependency, and shared native place served as a basis upon which favours and protection could be elicited, social contracts broadened and social distance and hierarchy established. These ties, despite often being instrumental in character, had an emotional component, *ganqing*, which served to deepen the psychic significance of native place for social identity

(Smith 2008, 38). On the other hand, Ambrose Yeo-chi King termed *guanxi* as "personal relationship" which is a form of interpersonal relationship predominately based on particularistic criteria, and *guanxi* building is the Chinese version of network building (King 1991, 63, 76 and 79).

To be more specific within political field, J. Bruce Jacobs defined *guanxi* as "particularistic ties" which play an important role in Chinese politics. He concluded that Chinese will prefer to ally with persons sharing a *guanxi* base when seeking political allies and to be politically useful a *guanxi* must be made "close" through the accretion of *ganqing*, which Jacobs termed as "affective component" of a *guanxi*, which can be nurtured and made *guanxi* closer through two dynamic processes: social interaction and utilisation. The bases of *guanxi* include locality, kinship, co-worker, classmate, sworn brotherhood, surname, teacher-student, economic and "public" (Jacobs 1979, 238, 251, 259 and 268). For *ganqing*, Morton H. Fried expressed it as "the quality of the relationship between the two parties" and elaborated it further as the primary institutionalised technique by which class differences are reduced between non-related persons, or between distantly related kin in his study of a county in China (Fried 1974, 103).

When *guanxi* was placed within the context of the early Republican China, Andrew J. Nathan brought out that most politicians had a clear mental map of a society in terms of "connections" or *guanxi*—particularistic dyadic relations, either actual or potential, and it characterised relationships within which relatively high levels of trust were expected. Through *guanxi*, cooperation was facilitated in a number of approaches: first, it eased social intercourse by establishing appropriate treatment between two persons of different status; second, it performed the behaviour of the members of the dyad toward each other predictable, both with regard to social formalities; third, predictability and ease of social intercourse contributed to the establishment of trust; fourth, trust was established by the commitment that the *guanxi* established to offer one another aid and support and not to betray one another. As such, the practice of searching one another's backgrounds for some *guanxi* to serve as a basis for a relationship reveals the importance of *guanxi* for establishing trust and the difficulty of proceeding politically without those *guanxi*. *Guanxi*, in general, were by no means a straitjacket for political activity (Nathan 1976, 48–50).¹

Jiujiang where Wu spent his childhood and youth was the place Wu started practising his persuasion skills and building his initial networks on his multiple *guanxi* base: first type *guanxi* base of "shared personal identification" or "ascriptive" or "prescriptive" such as native place, place of birth, place of residence and family friendship of former generations; second type *guanxi* base of "shared experience" or "achieved" or established early in a young man's career by virtue of a combination of circumstance and choice such as in the same

association or bureaucratic colleagues; third type *guanxi* base established entirely on the participants' initiative such as inlaws.²

J. Bruce Jacobs explained that a base for *guanxi* in Chinese culture depends on two or more persons having a commonality, or abbreviated as *tong* (同), of shared identification, that each of the persons having the *guanxi* base shares an aspect of personal identification which is important to them as individuals such as identification with family, hometown, school or place of work. Such an identification might be ascriptive, for example native-place or lineage, or it may involve shared experience. For instance, the teacher and student in a teacher-student *guanxi* share identification with an experience important to both of them, the education of the student (Jacobs 1979, 243). On the other hand, So Ying Lun and Anthony Walker had tried to classify two generic sources of the *guanxi* base. The first source is prescriptive: one is born into that relationship base which includes kinship, same hometown village, and same dialect; the other source is achieved: it is developed later in life, yet there is no implication that the base is deliberately developed. Such categories include classmates, schoolmates, co-workers, teacher-student, and superior-subordinate (So and Walker 2006, 63).

Andrew J. Nathan in the context of late Qing / early republican era, similar to what had been brought out by Fei Xiaotong on the ability to link with others who are not close relatives, viewed the identification of two persons could be tied together as when close *guanxi* were lacking, more far-fetched ones could be imputed to provide a common ground for two persons who were forced by circumstance into association (*lashang guanxi* 拉上关系). For a politician's birthright included some *guanxi*, while others could be cultivated. In this respect, Nathan had identified nine types of late Qing / early republican *guanxi* by a simple analytic typology. Three were ascriptive: lineage, family friendship of former generations and locality; four were established early in a young man's career by virtue of a combination of circumstance and choice: teacher-student, bureaucratic superior-subordinate, bureaucratic colleagues and schoolmate; and two were established entirely on the participants' initiative: inlaws and sworn brotherhood (Fei 1992, 31–32; Nathan 1976, 49–50).²

As for Wu's father, Wu Yutian, he worked as an accountant at a department store before operating his own foreign goods shop which gradually enhanced his social status after more than ten years. He was able to obtain a low rank official position, Sub-Prefect of the Fifth Rank, through donation and became deputy chairman at the local chamber of commerce in which Wu Tiecheng benefited from this status later in expanding his *guanxi* (Wu 1993, 2 and 8).³ This status actually extended into another type of *guanxi* for Wu Tiecheng to utilise later: family friendship of former generations (*shiyi guanxi*, *shijiao guanxi* 世谊关系,

世交关系), which linked members of the same generation of two families because of the close friendship of the fathers or grandfathers of the two families and also applies to the *guanxi* between a man and his friend's son (Nathan 1976, 51).

Wu Tiecheng, a mischievous child who resided near the foreign concession area recalled that the foreign properties and goods around him had attracted his attention. Jiujiang at that time was a trading port exposed to Western influence (Xu 1981, 34–35). At the age of seven, he received a traditional Chinese education in a private school at local Xinan Guild Hall (*Xinan Huiguan Sishu* 新安会馆私塾), a Cantonese guild hall, and later at the age of 14, under a private tutor. After the abolition of imperial examinations in 1905, he furthered his education in learning English for around two years before turning to a modern Western school, Tongwen Academy (*Tongwen Shuyuan* 同文书院), established by the Methodist Church of Jiujiang (Wu 1993, 2, 6–7).³ Through learning English during his childhood, it seemed to have enabled him to engage independently with foreigners while concurrently expanding his networks beyond China in the future. Wu Yutian constantly supervised Wu Tiecheng's education but he neither restrained Wu's ambition nor forced Wu to inherit his business. Instead he gave him the option to decide his own future path (Wu 1993, 7–8).

Contrary to Wu's own will in deciding his future career path, Wu's marriage was arranged by his father. Wu married when he was 22 in 1909 and his wife Ma Fengqi (马凤岐), a native from Shunde (顺德), Guangdong who grew up in Shanghai was the daughter of a steamship manager in Jiujiang. This was viewed as one of the typical examples of old style marriage commanded by parents and commonly found among Nationalist Government high ranking officials (Wu 1993, 8–9; Li and Guo 2010, 342; Liu 2009, 10–11). In fact, based on Wu's father and father-in-law both were in business circle, this could be an approach to build up another type of *guanxi* which not only gave advantages to them but Wu in the future, which was the inlaw tie (*yinqin guanxi* 姻亲关系): where arranged marriage was the norm in a society, inlaw *guanxi* were naturally important, due to marriages being arranged with an eye to further their advantages in politics or business. Polygyny made it likely to utilise marriage in this way even more freely. Marriages generally formalised alliances already made for political cooperation, therefore giving social sanction and structural reinforcement to relationships which might initially have been opportunistic and where the participants wanted the assurance that the inlaw *guanxi* had given (Nathan 1976, 54).

Before the 1911 Revolution, China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–95, the failure of The Hundred Days Reform in 1898, and the foreign encroachments especially within Jiujiang convinced Wu that the Qing regime was incompetent and weak. In addition to that, the Anti-Foreign Incident of Nanchang (*Nanchang Jiaoran* 南昌教案) or the Nanchang Affair of 1906 in Jiangxi which had caused a great stir, left Wu with strong and complex feelings on the hardships of his nation and people (Wu 1993, 12–14).⁴ Wu also recalled how he represented Jiujiang in presenting a petition to Nanjing on a coolie being beaten to death by a foreign concession police, but was ignored (Wu 1993, 14). On the other hand, Wu was astonished with the revolutionaries who were in rivalry with the constitutionalists. He was drawn especially to Sun Yat-sen, beginning from the latter's Revive China Society (*Xingzhonghui* 兴中会) and followed by the newspaper founded by his Revolutionary Alliance (*Tongmenghui* 同盟会) in Tokyo, the *People's Journal* (*Minbao* 民报) with its revolutionary propaganda. These new developments affected Wu as he thought it was appropriate for a traditional society in a new era and which subsequently moulded the path that he would follow (Wu 1993, 10–15).⁴

However, it was Lin Sen, one of the revolutionaries who originated from Fujian (福建) province and who later became Wu's mentor and close friend that had inspired his revolutionary thoughts and career in the beginning. Wu met up with Lin who had been transferred from the Shanghai Customs House to Jiujiang Customs at the time when Wu almost finished his studies at Tongwen Academy (Wu 1993, 15–16).⁵ They later founded the Philomathic Union of Xunyang (*Xunyang Yueshu Baoshe* 浔阳阅书报社) with the aim of advancing the social reform movement to promote reading among the public, especially newspapers and newly published books, which actually laid the foundation for political reform and revolutionary movement in Jiujiang. Lin was President while Wu was Vice President with the union expenses supported by Lin's own salary. As such, *guanxi* base of "shared experience" or "achieved": in the same association, was established between Wu and Lin as early as before the 1911 Revolution. It was said that Lin and Wu's public speaking skills at that time was unique and that it had its own charm which attracted the masses. Wu had started to display his eloquence in public speaking. The union also gained its reputation shortly after its establishment when Lin, Wu and other members carried out a successful lawsuit against the cover-up by a British consul in Jiujiang on an Indian constable who killed a villager Yu Chengfa (余程发) (Wu 1993, 16–18; Xu 1979, 39; Zou 1989, 926; Chen 1991, 98; Zheng 2009, 42).

The Union was joined by different kinds of people such as merchants, bankers, educators, gentry, New Army (*Xinjun* 新军) officers and foreign firm staffs whom Wu had built up his *guanxi* with and had expanded his circle of friends.

The convenience of transportation in Jiujiang attracted Cantonese and Anhuiese peddlers, many of whom became friends of Wu. He also benefitted from his father's status within the chamber of commerce, which was the *guanxi* of family friendship of former generations, to expand his network among the merchant-gentry. Through his own efforts, he had also penetrated into the military circle such as the 53rd Regimental Commander (*Biaotong* 标统) through Ma Yubao (马毓宝), who knew Wu's father, and the secret society. Other local prominent figures that Wu established his *guanxi* included the Prefect, Ye Daosheng (叶道绳) and the Director of Police, Li Xianzeng (李先曾) (Wu 1993, 16–18).⁵

After the Union progressed with more membership participation, Wu and the other union members submitted a joint petition to the Provincial Assembly (*Ziyiju* 咨议局) of each province to urge the Qing court to uphold constitutionalism earlier. Nevertheless, the regime chose to delay constitutionalism in a perfunctory manner. The act of submitting the petition by the union was however viewed by Tang Youqing as obviously going against Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary proposition (Tang 1985, 60). Nevertheless, the incident became a turning point which changed Wu's thinking from his original intention to foster social changes to become fully convinced about political reform. This could only succeed through revolution to overthrow the Qing regime, a course of action which was reinforced especially after he had conferred with Lin Sen (Wu 1993, 18–20). Apart from this change in political conviction, Wu still remembered he cut off his queue when he got married in 1909. This was an act of rebellion against the Qing dynasty which symbolically implied that he had turned into a radical revolutionary youth two years before the 1911 Revolution and he had joined the Revolutionary Alliance in the same year (Wu 1993, 9).⁶

The Union was transformed into a revolutionary base when various projects were planned secretly and carried out. It was pointed out that the Union was secured and developed rapidly as it had been protected by military and political key figures arising from the *guanxi* between Wu and them (Wu 1993, 17; Gao 1996, 43). As such, the Philomathic Union of Xunyang was regarded as one of the philomathic unions founded by revolutionaries and it became the underground organ of the Revolutionary Alliance. It was also recorded that Lin Sen during the summer of 1909 secretly organised and served as chief for the Jiujiang Branch of the Revolutionary Alliance with the assistance of Wu setting up the Philomathic Union of Xunyang. The leaders of the Union were seen as instigators and organisers of the uprising leading to the capture of Jiujiang (Li 1990, 111; Lai 2001, 67; Ping 1992, 20; Lin 2011, 48; Tang 1985, 59).

Military might was seen as the means to overthrow the regime, hence military training classes were set up in 1910 and officers from the 53rd infantry New

Army were recruited as instructors providing an opportunity for Wu and his comrades to get in touch with them. Wu, Lin Sen, Yu Xiangen (俞仙根) and He Ruichang (何瑞昌) received military training for half a year. There was also the establishment of Merchant Corps (*Shangtuan* 商团) to train the merchant militia in the same year. The training classes went on unnoticed and without any interference from the local authority as they were in the guise of training for protection against rebels, and maintenance of local order. The instructors were officers from the 53rd infantry New Army. Nonetheless, it was discovered that the New Army in Jiangxi was in fact more progressive, in that there were many outstanding youths with revolutionary ideas. There were also Revolutionary Alliance members holding positions or launching various activities among the troops and had progressed well (Wu 1993, 20; Lin 2011, 50; Wang 1992, 82; Tang 1985, 57; Ping 1992, 20). In fact, the vital tasks assigned by the headquarters of Revolutionary Alliance to their local branches were to organise students, ally with various parties, to mobilise the New Army and to launch the uprising. As such, Lin Sen, Wu Tiecheng and other revolutionaries were involved in numerous propaganda and organisation activities within the New Army in Jiujiang (Wang 1992, 83).

It is to be noted that New Army recruits were drawn from the communities in which they had established garrisons paving the way for good relations with the local people, and for many of the latter their only contact with the revolutionary movement was through the New Army (Gasster 2006, 508–509). Yoshihiro Hatano pointed out that all the officers and many of the soldiers were educated and interested in provincial affairs. They responded readily to revolutionary propaganda and sympathised with the developing nationalism of the enlightened literati, rich merchants, and modern intellectuals (Hatano 1968, 382). At the same time, merchants had been among the leading participants in anti-foreign demonstrations and boycotts, and they had supported both the revolutionary and constitutional movements. Many had been especially active in the petitioning of 1910. When it failed, they shared the feelings of the assemblymen and, like them, were prepared to participate in the anti-Qing movement although did not initiate it (Gasster 2006, 514). As for the Merchant Corps or Merchant Volunteer Corps at the time of the 1911 revolution, they had been closely associated with the dawning of nationalist feeling in the urban classes and the desire for local autonomy, which, according to public opinion, stemmed from the need to defend their individual liberties (Bergere 1998, 346–347).

At the same time, most of the Jiujiang tycoons were Cantonese and Wu who was considered a rich Cantonese was able to influence them effectively (Zhang, Qiyun 2012, 163). Wu was actually utilising his locality *guanxi* of native place, Guangdong. Locality *guanxi* (*tongxiang guanxi* 同乡关系) was one of the late

Qing / early republican *guanxi* identified by Andrew J. Nathan, which was persons coming from the same locality or region were considered to have a basis for trust and region was an important part of one's identity (Nathan 1976, 51). Meanwhile, Wu also built up his *guanxi* and network by making friends with officers and soldiers of the New Army apart from recruiting more comrades among them. Moreover, he was able in using the *guanxi* of inlaw tie, to associate himself with the fort commander, Xu Shifa (徐世法) who was his father-in-law's friend. Among other comrades whom Wu established contact were Jiang Qun (蒋群) or Jiang Junyang (蒋君羊) and Cai Gongshi (蔡公时). Apart from that, Wu, in order to call upon the masses to reform and to expand the revolutionary influence, participated in dramas and organised various events in Jiujiang which enabled him to liaise with different parties to spread revolutionary ideas (Wu 1993, 17 and 21; Gao 1996, 43).

In elaborating on Wu's childhood and youth especially in his early 20s, it could be seen that he was skilful in utilising his family members, namely his father and father-in-law's status, *guanxi* and network. Those were in fact the *guanxi* and networks of family friendship of former generations and in-law tie. In addition, Wu's skilful networking with the Cantonese in Jiujiang (Cantonese peddlers and tycoons) and locals (such as comrades in the Philomathic Union of Xunyang and New Army) witnessed the combination of locality *guanxi* of native place (Guangdong) and place of birth / place of residence (Jiujiang). All these were to his advantage in establishing friendships and widening his networks. He was capable of penetrating into different groups of peoples ranging from merchants to secret society members in Jiujiang. It is also indicated that since his youth, he exhibited certain special characteristics or charisma in forming *guanxi* with various peoples, and subsequently forging different types of networks. His formative years during his youth in fact provided Wu with a good starting point and a training ground for shaping not only his ability and charisma but also in building up his networks. His networks were from a small place of Jiujiang before extending out to other groups of peoples and areas in China and eventually stretching beyond to overseas territories in his later years. Moreover, military training that Wu received had become the starting point and foundation of his military and policing career in his subsequent years.

the chamber. He decided to stay in Tokyo after his visit to further his education (Wu 1993, 21).

However, on the eve of the Revolution, when Wu began his journey to Japan and reached Shanghai in early October, he received a telegram from a Japanese captain on the news of the Wuchang Uprising. Wu was nervous and excited after he had confirmed with the revolutionaries in Shanghai that the revolution had started. The delegation's trip to Japan was cancelled. He then rushed back to Jiujiang after receiving a telegram which summoned him to return. Wu met up with Lin Sen and knew that the news on Wuchang Uprising had reached Jiujiang. On 16 October, they contacted and gathered their comrades for discussion to take advantage of this event and to urge Jiujiang to participate in the Wuchang Uprising. The revolutionaries instigated the soldiers, police, fort officers and mass organisations. They also successfully approached key military officers, especially Ma Yubao who had been thoroughly persuaded or even forced, with the aim of deploying them within a week to launch the uprising simultaneously. The preparation for uprising went smoothly due to the role of Philomathic Union of Xunyang which had conducted a long period of anti-Qing propaganda and had organised liaison work. Subsequently, a unified and strong anti-Qing revolutionary force was formed as more New Army soldiers were inclined towards revolution (Wu 1993, 21–23; Zheng 1995, 28).⁷

However, when it was reported that conditions in Wuchang Revolution had become unfavourable and that reinforcements had been sent by the Qing regime, they decided to act earlier. On the night of 23 October, they started the Jiujiang Uprising by launching attacks on two government offices of the circuits and prefectures but the heads of both offices, Circuit Intendants Baoheng (保恒) and Prefect Puliang (璞良) had fled with their family members upon receiving news of the uprising. The scattered government troops left behind eventually joined the revolutionaries when they realised that it was hopeless for any further resistance. Jiujiang was finally in the hands of revolutionaries without firing a shot, joining Wuhan in victory (Wu 1993, 23).⁷

The report from the Governor of Jiangxi, Feng Rukui (冯汝骥) to the Qing government showed that the 55th Regiment led by Zhuang Shouzhong (庄守忠) confronted the revolt of the 53rd Regiment but lost due to disparity in army strength while Zhang Jian (张检) from the Department of Legal Affairs only arrived to supervise the defence. Feng also requested the government to instruct Zhang Jian to lead Zhuang Shouzhong and others to retaliate in conjunction with the reinforcement of navy gunboat in Jiujiang (Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan 1991, 189). Although the second day after the uprising, the Garrison Commander of Hukou (湖口), Yang Futian (杨福田) had assembled the gunboat to confront

the civil corps, it was defeated by Ma Yubao's troop. The victory at Hukou, which was the gateway of Jiujiang and a key location of Jiangxi inland waterway, was followed by the fall of Hukou Fort and Madang (马当) Fort in Pengze (彭泽) County into the hands of revolutionary army and thereafter stabilised their military defences at the Yangzi River. On the other hand, Zhuang Shouzhong had to cancel his plan of resistance in the city, and had to retreat as Ma's field artillery was pointing towards Zhuang military camp above the south gate of the city. Meanwhile, Zhang Jian also retreated due to defections of his guards after fire had broken out in the city (Luo 1985, 408; Gao 1967, 9; Zou 1989, 926; Zhang 1976, 213).

As such, Jiujiang was the first area within Jiangxi province to revolt and to fall within the fold of the revolutionaries. This, inevitably, influenced other areas in Jiangxi to follow suit, and it had even preceded the provincial capital, Nanchang (南昌) uprising which only happened a week later on 31 October (Li 2011, 690; Zhang 1976, 213; Jarman 2001a, 7). All these events had elevated the role of Lin Sen, Wu Tiecheng, local scholar-gentry Lou Daquan (罗大侗) and their comrades in contributing to the success of the Jiujiang Uprising (Liu 2011, 26).

As a result, a military government of Jiujiang was organised and established at the Circuit Intendant's Office with Ma Yubao proclaimed as Military Governor (*Dudu* 都督) of Jiujiang and Jiang Qun as Chief of Staff (*Canmou Zhang* 参谋长). Jiang Qun, however, later transferred his position to his friend, Li Liejun (李烈钧), the New Army officer allied with the Revolutionary Alliance who arrived a week after the Jiujiang Uprising (Guo 1987, 1411; Shen et al. 1984, 11). When Li arrived at Jiujiang and before being offered this position, he recollected that Wu Tiecheng, Zhang Huimin (张惠民), Zhuo Renji (卓仁机) and others had come to discuss and offer him key positions (Li and Tian 2007, 18).

Wu mentioned in his memoir that he was appointed as Chief Consultant Officer (*Zong Canyiguan* 总参议官), assuming charge of civil and diplomatic affairs related to the military, with Wu Zhaoxuan (吴照轩) as his deputy (Wu 1993, 24). In Wu's curriculum vitae attached with his letter to Sun Yat-sen in 1916, Wu nevertheless listed out the positions he had held in Jiujiang and Jiangxi were Director General of Jiujiang Telecommunication Bureau cum Foreign Affairs Staff (*Jiujiang Dianzheng Juzhang jian Jiaosheyuan* 九江电政局长兼交涉员), Officer of Staff of Jiujiang Military Government (*Xunjun Zhengfu Canmouguan* 浔军政府参谋官) and Director General of Jiangxi Foreign Affairs (*Jiangxi Waijiao Sizhang* 江西外交司长).⁸ Several other sources had referred Wu with titles similar to several positions found in his curriculum vitae. *The China Journal* referred to Wu's post as the Assistant Chief of General Staff of the

Military Government of Kiangsi (Jiangxi) Province and concurrently Commissioner of Foreign Affairs (The China Journal Publishing Company 1940, 43). While another source referred him as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and Chief of General Staff to the Military Governor (Zhu 1979, 3). Leng Peng referred to Wu as Major General cum Director of Staff and Foreign Affairs of Jiujiang Military Government (*Jiujiang Junzhengfu Shaojiang Canmou Chuzhang, Waijiao Chuzhang* 九江军政府少将参谋处长, 外交处长) (Leng 1983, 44). Several sources above unanimously quoted that Wu had two tasks: diplomatic or foreign affairs and general staff matters though Wu did not make reference to the latter in his memoir. The civil task brought out by Wu in his memoir and telecommunication affairs in his curriculum vitae, however, were not mentioned in those sources. This clearly shows that Wu Tiecheng since his 20s was fully skilled and capable of handling especially foreign affairs and general staff matters, as well as civil administration and telecommunication affairs.

Wu's close friend, Lin Sen, was appointed Minister of Civil Affairs but he declined the post in order to carry on with his Revolutionary Alliance's undercover work. An analysis of the structure of this military government shows that the appointments were shared between the New Army, revolutionaries, scholar-gentry and merchant leaders where the revolutionaries had considerable strength (Wu 1993, 24; Li and Lin 1982, 300; Zou 1989, 926; Li 2011, 689; Guo 1987, 1411). However, in Li Yunhan's classification on the position of the Revolutionary Alliance in the recovered areas, it reveals that Jiujiang fell under the second category in which the Revolutionary Alliance, Restoration Society (*Guangfu Hui* 光复会), constitutionalists and the army jointly completed the capture but contention nevertheless arose in the subsequently established administration (Li 1994, 767–772). At this juncture, it is noted that Wu who had contributed to the Jiujiang Uprising, and given the position he held in this complex and contentious administration, the following development will show how he established and expanded his *guanxi* and networks, revealing his charisma and persuasion skills.

The newly born fragile government met its first crisis when Ma Yubao and his subordinates heard that Wuchang had suffered a setback during counter-attacks by Qing's forces and that the military situation in Hanyang (汉阳) was critical. This was especially obvious as Ma previously had only been thoroughly persuaded or even forced to join the revolutionaries for the uprising. He had been described by Wu Tiecheng as an opium-addict and coward without firm views and revolutionary convictions. Liu Shiyi also shared similar view (Wu 1993, 24; Shen et al. 1996, 64). Wu and his comrades were afraid that this situation would affect the course of the revolution. They continuously motivated them to accept

the fact that Qing dynasty was on the verge of collapse. The motivation was effective when the officers were thrilled to the extent of cutting off their queues, an act of rebellion against the Qing dynasty (Wu 1993, 24). As a matter of fact, Ma himself also had no other option as after the uprising, Feng Rukui had asked the Qing government to mete out severe punishment on Ma (Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan 1991, 189). It would seem that owing to Wu's eloquence, he had the capacity to motivate or in general the skill to persuade which continued to prove an asset in the subsequent incident.

The next crisis occurred when Wu and Lin Sen, accompanied by a Fujianese adjutant Gong Yong (龚永) or Gong Shaofu (龚少甫), were assigned to contact the Qing navy which reached Jiujiang unexpectedly. The navy crew comprising mostly of Fujianese and some Cantonese was led by a Fujianese, Huang Zhongying (黄钟瑛). The meeting was a success as the navy had the intention of joining the revolutionaries (Wu 1993, 24–25). Li Liejun himself revealed that he was the person who despatched the personnel, without identifying their names, to approach the navy (Li and Tian 2007, 19). Luo Jialun in his *Chronological Life of Father of the Nation* also did not identify the personnel but in Li Xin's *History of Republic of China*, it was stated that the personnel were Lin Sen and Wu Tiecheng. Both Luo Jialun and Li Xin, however, stated that they were despatched by the Jiujiang Military Government (Luo 1985, 423; Li 2011, 690). Nonetheless, other sources such as Jiang Weiguo's (蒋纬国) *National Revolution War History* (*Guomin Geming zhanshi* 国民革命战史) stated that the personnel were Lin, Wu and others, while both Zou Lu's *Draft History of the Kuomintang* and Guo Tingyi's *Daily Records on Historical Events of Modern China* mentioned that Jiang Qun followed them. For Zou's source, he included Gong Yong, and Guo's source stated that Wu went as foreign affairs officer (*waijiaoguan* 外交官) (Jiang 1981, 147; Zou 1989, 998; Guo 1987, 1427). Zhang Guogan's *Historical Data of the 1911 Revolution* recorded in detail how Lin and Wu had boarded the vessel to approach the Acting Captain of *Hai Chen* (海琛), Lin Yongmo (林永谟) but it turned out later that Jiujiang Deputy Fort Commander, Ge Kean (戈克安) had bombarded *Hai Rong* (海容) when it had just reached Jiujiang and, Ling Yongmo and officer Zhang Yibo (张恽伯) had gone ashore to show Lin Sen and Li Liejun their proclamation to rise against the Qing (Zhang 1976, 190). In Luo Jialun's source, it was recorded that only Zhang Yibo went ashore to negotiate with Lin and Wu (Luo 1985, 423). However, Zhang Yibo in concert with Zhang Guogan stated that Ge Kean who formerly served in *Hai Rong* had bitter grievances with the Fujianese crew and had taken revenge by bombarding *Hai Rong*, and had wrongly accused it of attempting to flee away which aggrieved the navy but was successfully prevented by Lin Sen, Li Liejun and Wu Tiecheng (Zhang 2011, 488–490, 492–493). On the other hand, Tang Xiangming (汤芑铭)

who mentioned that he took over as interim navy commander when the navy reached Jiujiang, recalled that it was only Wu who liaised with them and that Wu was a former Jiujiang Customs supervisor (Tang 1963, 91). This incident happening around 13 November, although with different versions when referring to the persons involved, clearly projected Wu's major role. Anyway, this incident of the Qing navy arriving at Jiujiang could have happened was due to the blockade at Jiujiang after the uprising.⁸

Then, according to Wu, an unexpected turn for the worse occurred during the welcoming dinner for the navy hosted by the chamber of commerce. They received a report that the breechblock of their warship had been dismantled by the fort army. They viewed this as treacherous and an act of humiliation against the navy since their intention was to join rather than to surrender to the revolutionaries. Wu and his comrades relentlessly mediated and subsequently resolved the deadlock. They later investigated the cause and the breechblock was returned. They found that the dismantlement of the breechblock was instigated by Ge Kean who had previously been dismissed by the navy and had used this opportunity for revenge (Wu 1993, 25–26). It was the second revenge that as mentioned before, Ge had bombarded *Hai Rong* when it reached Jiujiang. In Luo Jialun's source neither this crisis nor mediation during the banquet was mentioned (Luo 1985, 423). However, Li Liejun in disclosing on this mediation stated that it was fortunate that Lin Sen, Gong Shaofu and Wei Zihao (魏子浩), without mentioning Wu, were there and that Li had immediately invited them, using the Fujianese locality *guanxi*, to give speeches to tone down the atmosphere (Li and Tian 2007, 19).⁹ Zou Lu had brought this out and that, without referring to Wu or the tension arising, had stated that Lin Sen and others had vigorously convinced the navy crew to cooperate during the welcoming reception while at the same time dismantled the breechblock of warships without any conflict arising later (Zou 1989, 998).¹⁰ Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, Zhang Yibo in his narration actually showed that the mediation was before the dinner (due to the bombardment of *Hai Rong* by Ge Kean), while during the dinner on the same day, both Lin Sen and Zhang Yibo on behalf of Huang Zhongying had given motivational speeches to the navy. Furthermore, it was noted that Ge Kean had intended to dismantle the breechblock, but the heavy task was impossible for him to execute (Zhang 2011, 490, 492–493). In the end, the Qing navy officially showed its allegiance to the revolutionaries in Jiujiang on 15 November, the day after the welcoming dinner (Guo 1987, 1428). Apart from this crisis, Wu also remembered that he, Lin Sen and Jiang Qun had the honour of leading the other warships to raise the "Blue Sky with a White Sun flag" (Wu 1993, 26).

The case of the Qing navy with its largest warships coming over to the revolutionary cause in Jiujiang was crucial. In the first place, Wu had contributed

in receiving and welcoming the Qing navy, earning their trust to side firmly with the revolutionaries. Nevertheless, in the crisis, due to the fact that most of the navy crew were Fujianese, Wu might not have been involved or only had played a minor role in comparison to Lin Sen and other Fujianese comrades who could utilise their locality *guanxi* of native place to their advantage. Yet it could not be denied that Wu had played his role in this case, by gaining the allegiance of the Qing navy to their side not only in helping to strengthen the Jiujiang revolutionaries but also the whole progress of the revolution in China as well. An illustrative example here would sufficiently show Wu's finesse in his hospitality skills to capture the heart of those who had come to Jiujiang around this period. Ma Chaojun (马超俊) narrated that while he and other revolutionaries from Wuhan were in Jiujiang before leaving for Shanghai, Wu had sent someone to board their ship to convey greetings and to provide each of them with travelling expenses (Guo et al. 1992, 28).

The army and navy of Jiujiang were united after this crisis following an emergency joint military affairs meeting. It was a crucial period as Hanyang had been recovered by Qing army and that the meeting had decided to send reinforcements to Nanchang at Jiangxi, Anqing (安庆) at Anhui (安徽) and Hubei (湖北). Nevertheless, Nanchang was recovered by the revolutionaries before the troops had arrived. It should be noted that some aspects of the military situation that Wu recalled in his memoir could actually have happened before and some only after the meeting (Wu 1993, 26).⁹ After some reshuffling of the post of military governor, Ma Yubao was generally proclaimed as Military Governor of Jiangxi province, stationed at Nanchang, and Jiujiang was transformed into a defence headquarter. Other military governments in Jiangxi were then dissolved signifying the unification of Jiangxi (Wu 1993, 28–29). On the other hand, the reinforcements to Hubei with another deployment from Nanchang was able to relieve it from a precarious situation, while reinforcements to Anqing were able to stabilise the situation with Li Liejun taking over from Wang Tianpei (王天培), acting as the Military Governor of Anhui (Wu 1993, 29).¹⁰ Although Wu did not participate in the above military missions, it still showed that the joint forces of Qing navy which Wu had won over had supported and strengthened the revolution within and beyond Jiangxi.

Impact of Wu Tiecheng's *Guanxi*

In general, it should be noted that this critical juncture served to build up Wu's initial *guanxi* and networks, and as an early training ground for his involvement in civil administration, diplomacy and general staff matters, apart from sharpening his personal skills and prowess in persuasion and mediation. Furthermore, Wu had actually established *guanxi* and cooperation with comrades

or colleagues in the Jiujiang Military Government, a *guanxi* and network within an association or bureaucratic system. This was a typical kind of *guanxi* between bureaucratic colleagues (*tongliao guanxi* 同僚关系): colleagues in the same office or enterprise, especially those who worked under the same superior, owing one another certain types of friendly behaviour and mutual support (Nathan 1976, 54). All these experiences had benefitted his career development after his departure from Jiujiang for further advancement within and beyond China.

In fact, it was this initial *guanxi* and networks at Jiujiang, and especially experiences gained by Wu in establishing, managing and forging those *guanxi* and networks during this early period—all mentioned were significant enough to exert influences on Wu's future. Several examples revealed that those influences were derived from the impact of his *guanxi* in Jiujiang and Jiangxi which later benefitted his subsequent developments after the 1911 Revolution. By the end of 1911, he was a representative of Jiangxi military government in Shanghai and one of the Jiangxi representatives who assembled at Nanjing at the time of the national conference (Wu 1993, 31–32, 34). In addition to that, just after the first Double Tenth celebration in 1912, Wu was also the initiator who set up the KMT Jiujiang Liaison Division (Wu 1993, 50). Indeed, the significant impact of Wu's *guanxi* had served and propelled his career to greater heights throughout his life journey in the post-Jiujiang period.

By drawing on several literary publications, it could be traced that Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) had utilised Wu's experiences in *guanxi* to assist him in specific capacities. Wu was listed by Fang Ke as one of Chiang's high-ranking aide (*gaoji muliao* 高级幕僚). The reason behind his appointment as Secretary-General of the KMT was to become Chiang's "housekeeper" (*guanjiapo* 管家婆), the purpose of which was to utilise his special talents to coordinate internal party relationships, especially to balance factional strife within KMT party such as between CC Clique or the Chen brothers (Chen Lifu 陈立夫 and Chen Guofu 陈果夫) and Zhu Jiahua (朱家骅) (Fang 2000, 378). It was also found that Chiang entrusted Wu with the task of representing him at the memorial service of the deceased and to become his special ambassador in this respect (致祭专使 *zhiji zhuanshi*). Since becoming Mayor of Shanghai, he had also become Chiang's permanent special ambassador (常任专使 *changren zhuanshi*). He mainly attended to those deceased from government departments, elderly and virtuous persons, distinguished personages and Overseas Chinese community leaders (An and Wang 2009, 409, 414). If Wu did not have extensive and good *guanxi* with those figures, and concurrently if he was also unable to persuade and convince them, he was certainly unable to carry out the above mentioned tasks.

In addition, Zhang Zhenxi evaluated Wu's foreign affairs work in accordance with the strategic post he held during different periods of time. Those efforts apparently utilised his interpersonal and communication skills. For example, "as Head of Shanghai, he was well versed in foreign relations with Japan; as Head of Guangdong, he handled relations with the Hong Kong and Macau colonial governments; maintained occasional friendly intercourse with diplomatic envoys from Britain, America and other countries, and mediated when something occurred. In all these ways he was able to assist government in the field of foreign affairs" (Zhang, Zhenxi 1975, 22). Zhang Jiuru further narrated how Wu attended to all aspects of a matter and how he coordinated the party:

He was able to establish contacts with various parties and community leaders during PCC to curb the influence that stemmed from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) representatives; coordinated party, military affairs and politics during the War of Resistance; gave opportunities to persons within and beyond the party to be elected during the national election—Wu Tiecheng participated and contributed to all those matters (Zhang, Jiuru 1975, 31).

By referring to the impact of Wu's *guanxi*, Zhang Qiyun had admitted that Wu as a political figure had the largest circle of friends within KMT (Zhang, Qiyun 2012, 161). This was further elaborated by Jin Lu:

He [Wu Tiecheng] had a large circle of friends throughout the world. His involvement included military affairs, party affairs, police management, politics, foreign affairs and civil affairs. He travelled throughout south and north China, extended his travel to Southeast Asia, faraway to America, Japan and Korea, where according to Zhang Qun (张群), the people whom he had come into contact were estimated to be millions upon millions. Senior statesman Chen Lifu said Wu should be considered the leader among the KMT second generation who was in touch with the most prominent figures and who had the largest circle of friends (Jin 1977, 20).

Thus, Wu had not only expanded the influence of party and government by crossing provincial boundaries within China, but had furthered it by crossing border beyond China to Hong Kong, Macau, Southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, Britain and America. This is a rare example hardly found in Republican history. This movement in fact was associated with the extensive personal, party and government networks that had been built up within and beyond China, connecting with personalities and groups abroad. These networks had exerted a

continuous influence that sustained the *guanxi* for certain periods. Indeed, those networks were linked with the foundation of Wu's extensive and multiple *guanxi* established through his interpersonal and persuasion skills which were able to be traced back to his Jiujiang period.

Conclusion

Overall, the capture of Jiujiang, a commercial port as well as a strategic location for military and defence, had a supportive effect in spreading the revolutionary fervour to other areas in the Yangzi Basin especially Wuhan, and the reinforcements from Jiujiang to other areas had strengthened the local revolutionaries' position. Moreover, the recovery of Jiujiang had also resulted in the supply line to the Qing navy navigating around that area to be severed, thereby forcing the navy to join the revolutionaries (Wu 1993, 29–30). Li Yunhan had indicated that the uprising of the Qing navy had greatly influenced the success of the revolutionary war in taking over of each province. The defection of the largest Qing navy at Jiujiang not only supported army uprising along the coast and rivers of each province, but also enabled the army to transport its troops northwards for northern expedition, posing a threat to Yuan Shikai (袁世凯), thereby contributing indirectly to peace negotiations and subsequent unification (Li 1994, 773–774). As a matter of fact, Jiujiang was not only strategically important as shown in the Qing Emperor decree on the eve of the Jiujiang Uprising, but also unique in the history and development of the 1911 Revolution (Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan 1991, 184). This was pointed out by Jin Chongji (金冲及), who claimed that Jiujiang was an exceptional case of a provincial uprising in which its influence could originate and radiate out from the provincial capital. The reasons behind Jiujiang's important role in achieving the independence of Jiangxi, Jin continued, were not merely the concentration of main troops of Jiangxi New Army there, but also due to its developed economy and culture, and convenience of transportation as mentioned in the beginning of this paper (Jin 2011, 351–352).

The uniqueness of Jiujiang gave Wu a favourable geographical position, providing him with a golden opportunity, which together with his *guanxi*, networks and eloquence or persuasion skills he could utilise for his own advantage. His involvement in the revolution at Jiujiang, in fact, had earned him the reputation as being one of the progressive revolutionary individuals in KMT and Republican history. Liu Shiyi reaffirmed that Wu was the one person who had put in the most effort to contact and to negotiate with different parties after the independence of Jiujiang (Shen et al. 1996, 108). Zhang Xizhe (张希哲) further considered that the independence of Jiujiang, which thereby accelerated the momentum of 1911 Revolution, was Wu's first major event among his

numerous meritorious services and great achievements (Zhang, Xizhe 2012, 173). Moreover, the pivotal aspect to be emphasised is the impact of Wu's *guanxi* in this period which was significant and had lasted throughout his life journey.

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Notes

1. The details on this section of Wu Tiecheng are based on: Zhang, Zhenxi 1991, 74–89; Chen 2006, 148–153; Institute of Taiwan Studies 2001, 891–892; Zhu 1979, 1–5; Zhang, Mingkai 1991, 239–243; Huang 1983, 22; Chen 1996, 106–107; Jiang 1987, 198–199; Jiang 1985, 162–163; and Jarman 2001b, 679.
2. For consistency, term will be used rather than the term "connection" used in Nathan's book.
3. Details of those *guanxi* will be brought out in a subsequent discussion.
4. Some of the mentioned *guanxi* will be brought out along the discussions when it is related.
5. Wu Yutian was a successful merchant when Li Liejun (李烈钧) mentioned Wu Yutian store, *Hechang* (合昌) and the business prospered until he set up another branch at Mount Lu (Lushan 庐山). See Ma 2007, 37.
6. According to the three categories drawn out by Andrew J. Nathan, for men born in the 1880s a pure classical education was no longer practical. Those who began their training with classical study aimed at the examinations had to change course when the examinations based on the classical curriculum were abolished in 1905. Young men who aspired to serve in the government service now had to prepare themselves either through a new-style domestic education or by studying overseas, or both. Of those who studied abroad the vast majority went to Japan. See Nathan 2005, 260.
7. A French Lazarist priest, Jean-Marie Lacruche was suspected of assaulting Jiang Zhaotang (江召棠), who had been transferred from Dehua County (*Dehuaxian* 德化县, present Jiujiang County) to Nanchang as magistrate, in the residence of the head of the Catholic mission in Nanchang on the afternoon of 22 February 1906. It

- was viewed as a challenge to the Chinese nation and a derogation of sovereignty. See Young 1996, 91 and 95.
8. Sun Yat-sen founded his first organisation, the Revive China Society in Hawaii in November 1894, which moved to Hong Kong in 1895. The Revolutionary Alliance was founded by Sun in Tokyo in August 1905. See Bergere 1998, 49 and 127.
 9. Wu mentioned in his memoir that his meeting up with Lin was by coincidence, while in "Chronological Life of Lin Sen" (*Lin Sen Nianpu* 林森年谱), it was recorded that Lin met Wu at Guling (牯岭), Mount Lu during the summer of 1909 (see Lin 2011, 48). However, Ma Shexiang based on Li Liejun's narration had a different story on how Wu and Lin met up. Li Liejun, according to what Wu and Lin told him on their first meeting showed that Wu had known Lin's anti-Qing activist thoughts through Wu Fujian's schoolmates and that their first meeting happened when Wu, unnoticed by Lin, was actually following him up the Mount Lu. See Ma 2007, 34–37.
 10. Liu Shiyi (刘士毅) recalled there were two groups of secret societies in Jiujiang where the Hong Gang (*Hongbang* 洪帮) members mostly could be found within the army such as those who guarded the Jiujiang Fort while the Green Gang (*Qingbang* 青帮) members were mostly within the docker and boatman of salt boat along the Yangzi River Basin. See Shen et al. 1996, 64 and 110.
 11. Henrietta Harrison pointed out that radical revolutionaries of the late Qing cut off their queues or allowed the hair on the front of the head to grow long as a symbol of their defiance of the Manchus and as a link with the Ming loyalists, whose heirs they claimed to be. See Harrison 2000, 31.
 12. *Dahan Newspaper*, a revolutionary newspaper, was only published after the 1911 Revolution. Bai Zhishan (白雉山) stated that it started publication on 15 October but Li Jing (李璟) stated one day earlier, 14 October. Nevertheless, Bai and Li unanimously stated it was founded by Hu Shian (胡石庵) at Hankou (汉口) (See Bai 2011, 34–35; Li 2001, 36). Nevertheless, what Wu mentioned could be the *Dajiang Newspaper* established by both Zhan and He at Hankou after October 1910, the official newspaper of Institute for the Restoration of Martial Spirit (*Zhenwu Xueshe* 振武学社) which was later reorganised as Literary Institute (*Wenxueshe* 文学社). This newspaper was closed down and both of them were arrested in July 1911 when they published two commentaries causing panic to the local authority. See Zhang and Li 2005, 380 and 382; Guo 1987, 1406.
 13. For the case of Ma Yubao, the *Draft History of the Kuomintang* mentioned that Ma was only convinced after all sorts of persuasion by the revolutionaries, and Juzheng (居正) mentioned that Ma immediately led his regiment over to the revolutionaries side after being repressed by the Revolutionary Alliance comrades, while in *Chronological Life of Father of the Nation* (*Guofu Nianpu* 国父年谱), it was stated that Ma agreed to revolt as a result of pressure from his troops in the 53rd Regiment. This happened after Jiang Qun and other comrades persuaded Jiujiang New Army upon knowing that the New Army in Jiangxi was unwillingly to obey the command of the Qing government to send reinforcements to Hubei (湖北). On the other hand, Liu Shiyi recalled how the army official, Liu Shijun (刘世

- 均) and Ma's residence staff, Zhu Hantao (朱汉涛) who was also leader of the Hong Gang had forced Ma to lead the revolution. See Zou 1989, 926; Chen and Ju 1998, 60; Luo 1985, 408; Shen et al. 1996, 64–65.
14. British "Annual report of events in China for the year 1911" also stated that Jiujiang fell on the 23 October. See Jarman 2001a, 6.
 15. "Zongli shoupi Wu Tiecheng qingxiang Li Yuanhong tuijian han" 总理手批吴铁城请向黎元洪推荐函 (Instructions of the President, Sun Yat-sen in Wu Tiecheng's letter on requesting him for recommendation to Li Yuanhong), Zhongguo Guomindang Dangshiguan (Kuomintang Party Archives, Taipei, abbreviated as DSG) Yiban 一般 052/513, file "Yiban Dangan" 一般档案 (General Archives).
 16. The blockade especially set up by Li Liejun at the Yangzi River had intercepted ships moving upstream and had cut off the waterway support line to the Qing army in Hankou. This meant the Qing Yangzi River Fleet would face difficulties navigating between Wuhan and Jiujiang. Three of the four Qing navy giant cruisers, *Hai Chou* (海筹), *Hai Rong* and *Hai Chen*, excluding *Hai Qi* (海圻) which was still in Europe, and other warships were under the command of Navy Admiral Sa Zhenbing (萨镇冰) in battling against the revolutionaries at Hankou. Most of navy crews sympathised with the revolution, and instigated by Zhang Yibo and several officers, turned to the revolutionaries. Zhang Yibo, a navy officer of *Hai Chen*, was one of the officers who wanted an uprising and instigated Huang Zhongying and his navy to revolt. As such, Sa had to pass the command of the fleet to the Captain of *Hai Chou*, Huang Zhongying, while captains of the *Hai Chen* and *Hai Rong* who were Manchus relinquished their commands to their Deputy Captain. The fleet departed from Yangluo (阳逻) with a white flag hanging on the warships and reached Jiujiang on 13 November. See Twentieth Century China Chronicle Editorial and Gong et al. 2002, 604; Li 2011, 690; Wang 1992, 88; Zhang 1976, 186, 189–190; Zou 1989, 998; Jiang 1981, 147; Luo 1985, 422; Guo 1987, 1425 and 1427.
 17. Li Liejun also disclosed in his version of the crisis that, Huang Zhongying who was aggrieved had ordered his crew returning to the warship to prepare for battle when knowing that Ma Yubao had secretly ordered Ge Kean to dismantle the breechblock. The breechblocks were returned the next day after the mediation and the crisis ended.
 18. This action of dismantling the breechblock was also mentioned in Zhang Guogan's *Historical data of the 1911 Revolution*. See Zhang 1976, 190.
 19. Prior to the meeting, the Qing navy joined the revolutionaries in Jiujiang on 13 November, followed by the setting up of joint army and navy committee, housed at the parlour of the Jiujiang Investment Promotion Bureau (*Jiujiang Zhaoshangju* 九江招商局). The Qing navy later showed its allegiance to the revolutionaries in Jiujiang on 15 November. Li Liejun only led the cruiser *Hai Chou* and other warships to suppress the rebellion at Anqing on 18 November, while Tang Xiangming led the cruisers *Hai Chen*, *Hai Rong* and other warships to Wuchang in Hubei on the following day. As such, this would mean the meeting was held between 15 and 17 November but Hanyang only fell to the Qing army on 27 November and Nanchang had been recovered by the revolutionaries as early as 31

- October, even before the Qing navy joined them. See Li 2011, 690; Guo 1987, 1417, 1428, 1430–1431, 1434–1435.
20. The deployment of 3,000 troops from Nanchang first reached Jiujiang on 21 November and then on 28 November, covered by cruisers *Hai Rong* and *Hai Chen*, landing at downstream of Hankou, Yangluo. Li Liejun who departed from Jiujiang on 18 November, his mission, apart from suppressing the rebellion, was also to take over the position of Military Governor of Anhui on behalf of Ma Yubao. Wang Tianpei had actually left when Li Liejun had reached there where Huang Huanzhang (黄焕章) despatched previously from Jiujiang, was in control but his unruly action had incited tension there which Li needed to mediate and take over control. Li left on 28 November to aid Wuchang and the post was later transferred to Sun Yujun (孙毓筠). Deployment from Nanchang, Li's military aid and other troops' reinforcement had strengthened the defence of Wuchang. See Guo 1987, 1430–1431, 1436; Li 2011, 696; Zou 1989, 953).

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